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Washington and New Delhi once took pride in one of the most robust strategic partnerships of the post–Cold War period. The relationship, formed and reinforced over more than two decades of diplomatic and defense ties, is at one of its worst points in recent memory.

“The whole edifice of the U.S.-India relationship has been built on these premises and assumptions of the last 25 years, and a lot of people worked very hard to build it, including the president in his first term — and they just came completely unraveled,” said Evan Feigenbaum, a South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The trust is gone.”

The immediate crisis point was President Donald Trump’s decision this year to impose tariffs on virtually all Indian goods in retaliation for New Delhi’s refusal to cut off purchases of Russian oil despite the war in Ukraine. The tariff, which started at 25 percent and is set to increase to 50 percent on August 27, has done little to dissuade India from Russian energy and may even have pushed New Delhi closer to Moscow and Beijing.

Over the past several weeks, India’s national security adviser visited Moscow, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar held top-level talks there, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi just wrapped up meetings in New Delhi. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to travel to China for the first time in more than seven years and has a highly likely visit to Moscow with Russian President Vladimir Putin before the end of the year. Some Indian officials also have an unannounced stop in China planned this week. Observers say it is more than just optics.

Indian public opinion is also souring against what many in New Delhi see as unwarranted U.S. intervention in its sovereign decision-making. “They’re signaling very clearly that they view that as interference in India’s foreign policy, and they are not going to put up with it,” Feigenbaum said.

India’s state-run refiners had briefly halted Russian purchases after the start of the war out of concern from the Trump administration, but resumed them when faced with discounts of six to seven percent. The result is that Russian oil now makes up 35 percent of India’s overall crude imports, up from 0.2 percent before the war. Moscow has welcomed the opportunity and is expanding its offerings. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov said Moscow “will continue to ship crude, oil products, thermal and coking coal.” He also sees “potential for the export of Russian LNG.”

Pulling Away

Michael Kugelman, a South Asia analyst based in Washington, said Trump’s tariffs are not the only factor behind India’s decisions. “We’ve seen indications for almost a year of India wanting to ease tensions with China and strengthen relations, mainly for economic reasons. But the Trump administration’s policies have made India want to move even more quickly,” he said.

Much of what India is doing might be performative, he added. “But that being said, there are other non-performative, substantive areas in which India is growing closer with Russia, notably in the energy and military domains.”

Feigenbaum agreed that “India is going to double down on some aspects of its economic and defense relationship with Russia — and those parts are not performative.”

India had already been diversifying its military procurement away from Russia in recent years. Before the Ukraine war, it had already largely replaced Soviet-era military systems with newer U.S., French, and Israeli platforms. Since the invasion, however, trade with Moscow has skyrocketed. Kugelman said this means “Russia has proven itself as an important international partner and that it has made good on its promise of providing energy and security assistance to New Delhi — a fact that only validates India’s belief that the U.S. can’t be trusted, whereas Russia can — because Russia is always going to be there for India no matter what.”

Modi has made some hay domestically with the decisions as well. By insisting he must protect the livelihoods of farmers, small businesses, and young workers first and foremost, he has put his foot down on issues the United States would like India to bend. Kugelman recalled that New Delhi had already made concessions on tariffs, worker repatriation, and other areas. “Because of those concessions, India needs to be careful about signaling further willingness to bend. This is one reason there was no trade deal — Modi put his foot down,” he said.

White House frustration was visible. In the Financial Times, former White House trade adviser Peter Navarro wrote that Indian oil purchases “are opportunistic and deeply corrosive to the U.S.-India relationship.” He wrote that Trump had no choice but to raise tariffs to hurt India, where it hurts “its access to U.S. markets — even as it seeks to cut off the financial lifeline it has extended to Russia’s war effort.”